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Credit Growth and Instability in Balkan Countries: The Role of Foreign Banks
1 
 
Abstract - The present paper seeks to examine the role played by foreign banks in the credit 
growth in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia. Fast credit expansion was the main 
contributor to economic growth in these countries prior to the financial and economic crisis 
of 2007-2010. This development is associated with the entry of foreign banks, particularly 
banks from EU-15 countries. In addition, the Balkan countries faced large capital inflows 
from  parent  banks  located  in  old  EU  member  states.  It  is  argued  that  the  rising  profit 
orientation and the increase in the risk proclivity of European banks, which have been the 
result of the financialisation of the European Union banking sector, was the main driver 
behind the fast credit growth rates in the Balkan countries. With the outbreak of the recent 
financial  and  economic  crisis,  concerns  about  the  quality  of  outstanding  loans  have 
materialized.  The  global  economic  crisis  and  the  increase  in  bad  loans  then  led  to  a 
breakdown of the debt-led growth model in the region. 
                                                 
1 The author is grateful to Engelbert Stockhammer for comments. 1 Introduction 
 
Countries of Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe (CESEE) experienced fast credit 
growth rates in the private sector prior to the financial and economic crisis of 2007-2010. This 
lending boom was associated with the expansion of foreign banks into the region. Moreover, 
credit  growth  was  boosted  further  by  capital  inflows  from  parent  banks  located  in  old 
European Union member states. The main driver behind the credit expansion by foreign banks 
is  the  rising  profit  orientation  of  these  banks,  accompanied  by  an  increase  in  their  risk 
proclivity. Structural changes in the EU banking sector build the background for this rising 
profit orientation of EU banks. These structural changes have occurred since the 1990s and 
can be summarized under the term financialisation. 
This article examines the role played by foreign banks in the credit growth in Balkan 
countries. The three Balkan countries considered here are Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia 
and Serbia. After the entry of foreign banks, these countries have experienced lending booms, 
particularly  in  the  household  sector.  A  great  portion  of  loans  have  been  denominated  in 
foreign currencies, mainly in euros, and have been partly used for purchases of consumption 
goods. This in turn led to a growth model, which was based on a rising indebtedness of the 
private sector. 
Banks have been engaged in an expansion of riskier loans during the lending boom. After 
the crash of the US subprime market, rising concerns about the quality of outstanding loans in 
the Balkan countries have occurred. As the financial crisis spread to Europe, these concerns 
have materialized. An increase in the share of bad loans led to a slowdown in bank lending. 
As a consequence, the debt-led growth model was hit by the financial crisis, leading to a sharp 
drop in GDP growth rates in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia. 
The  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  The  next  section  explains  the  main  hypotheses 
regarding the financialisation of the European Union banking sector and is followed by some 
theoretical considerations about credit growth in banking systems, which are dominated by 
foreign-owned  banks.  The  next  part  of  the  paper  presents  some  stylized  facts  about  the 
expansion of EU banks into Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia, the development of 
domestic credits and cross-border banking inflows and financial and macroeconomic stability. 
Finally, the main results are summarized in a concluding section. 
 2 The background: Financialisation of the EU banking sector 
 
The term financialisation lacks a unique definition and is usually used to describe a lot of 
phenomena. It is, for example, associated with the deregulation of financial markets and the 
liberalization of international capital flows. It has also been used to explain the shareholder 
value orientation of non-financial business or the rise in investment in financial assets by non-
financial  firms.  The shift  from  bank-based to  market-based financial systems  is  a further 
example, which has been mentioned in the financialisation literature.
2 
In this paper financialisation will be narrow ly defined, as it refers only to the structural 
changes in the European Union banking sector. There has been recent literature discussing the 
financialisation of the banking sector of advanced capitalist countries (Erturk & Solari 2007; 
dos Santos 2009; Lapavitsas 2009b). Mainly two points have been mentioned. First, as large 
enterprises have relied increasingly on direct borrowing in open markets, the banking sector 
has been looking out for new profit sources. As a consequence, commercial banks shift ed 
their  lending  to  private  hou seholds.  Second,  commercial  banks  in  advanced  capitalist 
countries adopted investment banking practices and now generate a remarkable part of their 
profits by non-interest income. While the spread between lending and borrowing rate s has 
been the main source of profits for these banks in the past, they now offer their customers, 
particularly private households, a lot of other financial services products, like insurance, 
savings or pension plans. 
The present article aims at highlighting two other aspects of financialisation, which are 
important for the banking sectors in European Union member states. One of these aspects has 
been the rise of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) in the European Union banking sector since 
the 1990s, which led  to an increase in balance sheets of major European banks. A further 
consequence of the wave of M&As has been a weakening of competition, as the number of 
credit institutions in the EU-15 decreased from 9,077 in 1997 (ECB 2010: 23) to 7,102 in 
2008 (ECB 2003: 3). Proponents of such M&As in the banking sector highlight economies of 
scale as a major factor behind this development. However, such economies of scale may 
disappear when a bank gets too big, measured in terms of its assets (Dymski 1999: 16). 
Nevertheless, financialisation in the Euro Area banking sector is also evident, as total banking 
assets have been rising in relation to GDP during the period 1997-2008 (RMF 2010: 38). 
                                                 
2 Erturk et al. (2008) offer a summary of some key texts to financialisation; Erturk and Solari (2007), dos Santos 
(2009) and Lapavitsas (2009b) discuss changes in the banking sector; Schaberg (1999) examines the shift from 
bank-based to market-based financial systems. A further point, which is also the most important one for this paper, is the aggressive 
expansion  of  banks  from  the  EU-15  to  the  new  EU  member  and  candidate  countries. 
Privatisation  and  liberalisation  policies  in  the  transition  countries  of  Central,  Eastern  and 
Southeastern Europe enabled the entry of foreign banks, which have been looking out for new 
profitable  markets.  The  expansion  of  foreign  banks  into  the  region  have  been  mainly 
promoted by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which see the presence of 
foreign banks as a source of stability for the financial sector in these countries (Stein 2010: 
260-261). 
 
3 Foreign-owned banks and credit expansion 
 
The  banking  system  in  some  European  Union  member  countries,  like  Germany  or 
Austria, was characterized by a large number of regional banks, savings institutions or state-
owned development banks in the past, where banks were not exclusively profit-oriented. In 
these  countries,  banks  were  also  engaged  in  achieving  common  goals,  like  regional 
development or industrial promotion. However, the banking system in Austria, for example, 
has undergone significant structural changes since the 1990s. Prior to the integration in the 
European Union, state-owned banks in Austria have been privatized and savings institutions 
changed their legal form and act now as stock companies (Stockhammer 2010b). In addition, 
there has been an increase in M&A activity in the Austrian banking sector. These structural 
changes  led  to  a  rising  profit  orientation  of  Austrian  banks.  As  the  countries  of  Central, 
Eastern  and  Southeastern  Europe  offered  banks  the  opportunity  of  high  profits,  Austrian 
banks  expanded  into  the  region.  The  high  profitability  in  the  banking  sectors  in  CESEE 
countries attracted also banks from Germany, Italy or France to enter the region. As a result, 
banks from the EU-15 countries are now major players in the CESEE region, holding up to 
90% of total banking assets in many countries. 
With the presence of foreign banks,  credits  to  the private sector in  CESEE  countries 
began to increase significantly. The main driver behind the fast credit growth has probably 
been the higher profitability in the region than in the EU-15. A high gap between interest on 
loans  and  interest  on  deposits,  which  significantly  exceeds  that  in  the  old  EU  member 
countries, may have fuelled credit growth in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe. Fast 
credit growth rates could also be pushed by profit-based payment schemes for bank managers. 
Top managers of foreign owned banks are in many cases expatriate professionals from the parent  bank’s  home  country,  who  work  on  a  limited  term  and  receive  parts  of  their 
remuneration from bonus payments. Due to the high profitability, a high volume of lending 
boosts profits, which in turn determine the size of the bonus payments. Thus, the managers of 
foreign-owned banks could be interested in fast credit expansion in order to boost their own 
income (Mihaljek 2008: 26). Moreover, the balance sheet structure of an individual bank is 
not only the result of its own management’s decision, it is also dependent on the balance sheet 
structure of other banks in the banking system (Alves et al. 2008). Therefore, if one bank 
increases its assets by expanding loans, other banks may follow, and the result may be an 
overall acceleration of credit growth in a country. 
Furthermore,  a  high  interest  gap  between  the  CESEE  countries  and  the  EU  member 
countries,  may  lead  to  capital  flows  from  parent  banks  located  in  the  EU-15  to  their 
subsidiaries in CESEE countries in order to gain profits by expanding credits. Such capital 
inflows could also be the result of direct borrowing from abroad by non financial companies. 
As a consequence, the credit expansion in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe will be 
further boosted by these capital inflows. 
The  profit-based  credit  expansion  may  be  accompanied  by  an  increase  in  the  risk 
proclivity of the considered banks. Foreign banks, which expanded into the CESEE region, 
are generally part of major European banking companies, which present an important part in 
financial intermediation  in  their home  countries.  Therefore, the incentive to  expand risky 
loans could rise due to the anticipation that governments would support these banks if they get 
in  trouble  (Eichengreen  2003:  42).  Moreover,  the  fast  credit  expansion  may  lead  to  an 
inability of banks to appropriately asses the build-up in credit risk. Due to a lack of regular 
contact and personal relations with their borrowers, foreign banks rely heavily on statistical 
methods  to  evaluate  the  credit  risk  of  their  costumers.  Credits  are  therefore  based  on 
numerical information and are granted if an individual exceeds a threshold (Lapavitsas 2009b: 
138-139).  As  these  statistical  methods  have  been  designed  for  risk  evaluation  in  major 
capitalist markets, they may be inappropriate for emerging and transition countries (Mihaljek 
2008:  25).  As  a  result,  fast  credit  expansion  may  lead  to  an  increase  in  risky  loans  and 
eventually threaten financial and economic stability. 
 
 
 4 Stylized Facts 
 
Expansion of EU banks into the Balkans 
 
Like in other countries of Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, the transition process 
in  the  successor  countries  of  the  former  SFR  Yugoslavia  has  been  characterized  by 
liberalisation  and  privatisation  policies,  which  attracted  foreign  banks  to  expand  into  the 
region. Figure 1 shows the development of the ownership of the banking system in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia. 
 
Figure 1: Ownership structure of the banking sector in percent 
 
Source: CBBH (2009, 2010a), BARS (2003), BAFBH (2003), CNB  (Banking sector, Standard 
presentation format), NBS (2002, 2006, 2010). 
Notes: For Bosnia and Herzegovina the ownership structure in 2001 is related to shareholders’ 
capital. For the calculation of the ownership structure the relevant sectors in the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska were summarized and divided by the sum of 
total shareholders’ capital in the two entities. 
 
 
The privatisation policies in the banking sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina set in at the 
end of the 1990s. The share of state-owned banks in shareholders’ capital declined to 20% 
until 2001. On the other side, the share of foreign banks rose to 55%. In contrast to 2001, the 
ownership structure for Bosnia and Herzegovina in figure 1 for the years 2005 and 2009 is 
related to the assets of the banking sector. Until 2005 foreign banks have purchased the major 
part of the banking system in Bosnia and Herzegovina and at the end of 2009 they held 90.8% 
of total assets, while state-owned banks accounted for only 4.7%. 
The transition process in Croatia started earlier than in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1996 
the Croatian state owned nearly 80% of total assets of the banking sector, while foreign banks 
accounted for only 1%. In the period 1998-1999, Croatia suffered from a banking crisis, and 
as the economy was on the road to recovery, major privatisations to foreigners have been executed (Kraft 2004: 156). As a result, 84% of the assets of the banking sector in Croatia 
were  already  foreign-owned  in  2000.  Foreign  banks  expanded  their  ownership  further  to 
almost 91% until the end of 2009. On the other side, the state held a modest share of 4.2% at 
the end of 2009. 
The entry of foreign banks in Serbia set in later than in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Croatia. While more than 65% of the banking sector was owned by the state in 2001, foreign 
banks accounted for some 13%. However, the latter expanded their share to 66% until the end 
of 2005. Further purchases of Serbian banks by foreigners led to a 74% foreign-owned share 
of the banking sector in Serbia at the end of 2009. In the same year the state held a 17% share 
in the banking sector, which was much higher than the state-owned shares in the banking 
sectors of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. On the other side, the dominance of foreign 
banks in Serbia is lower than in the other two countries. 
Figure 2 shows the ownership of foreign-owned banks by countries. While the shares in 
the ownership for Bosnia and Herzegovina are based on shareholders’ capital of foreign-
owned banks, for Croatia and Serbia they are related to total assets of foreign-owned banks. 
As can be seen, Austrian
3
 banks account for the highest share in foreign-owned banks, with a 
figure of 63.2% and 66.5% in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, respectively. In Serbia, 
Austrian banks account for almost 37%, and are followed by Greek and Italian banks, with a 
share of 20.8% and 19.2%, respectively. Italian banks hold also a remarkable share of 21.4% 
of foreign-owned banks’ assets in Croatia. 
 
Figure 2: Ownership of foreign-owned banks by country in percent, end of 2009 
 
Source: CBBH (2010a), CNB (2010), NBS (Ownership structure and financial reports). 
Notes: The ownership structure for Bosnia and Herzegovina is based on shareholders’ capital, for 
Croatia and Serbia on assets of the banking sector. The ownership structure for Serbia relates to 
30th June 2010, and was calculated on the basis of individual bank data, which were obtained 
from the homepage of the NBS. 
 
 
                                                 
3 The former Austrian Bank Austria Creditanstalt is a member of the Italian Unicredit Group since 2005. As the 
Bank Austria still control their subsidiaries in the CESEE region, they are reported here as Austrian banks. As can be seen from figure 2, foreign-owned banks in the Balkan countries are highly 
concentrated by countries, with Austria having the leadership, followed by Italy. In addition, 
the ownership of banking assets is also very high by the number of banks. For example, the 
five  largest  banks  owned  more  than  59%  of  the  banking  sector’s  assets  in  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina in 2009, while the largest 10 accounted for almost 80% (CBBH 2010a: 79). The 
ownership concentration in Croatia is even higher than in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 2009 
the largest 6 banks accounted for 82.7% of total assets of the Croatian banking sector (CNB 
2010: 64). In comparison to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, the concentration in Serbia 
is lower, where the largest 5 banks own some 46% of the banking sector’s assets (NBS 2010: 
74). 
The high profitability potential in the Balkan countries may have been a driving force 
behind the expansion of banks from old EU member countries into the region. Kraft (2004), 
for example, examines the reasons for foreign bank entry in Croatia, and concludes that high 
interest margins have been an important factor. However, he argues that other pull factors, 
like  the  search  for  new  clients  or  the  potential  of  lending  to  households,  has  been  more 
important than high interest margins for keeping foreign banks in Croatia. Table 1 shows 
some measures of profitability in the banking sector for the three Balkan countries compared 
to some European Union member countries. 
As can be seen, for most of the years Return on Assets (ROA) has been significantly 
higher in  Croatia  and Serbia than in  those EU  member countries,  whose banks  are most 
engaged in the Balkans. ROA in Bosnia and Herzegovina was also on a high level prior to 
2008, but experienced a sharp drop after the outbreak of the recent financial and economic 
crisis. However, regarding Return on Equity (ROE) as another profitability measure, no clear 
differences are obvious  between the  Balkan and the EU member countries. Only Croatia 
shows Levels of ROE, which in some years were higher than in the reference countries of the 
European Union. It is also worth to mention that due to differences in national accounting, 







 Table 1: Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) in the banking sector in percent, 
2000-2009 
 
Source: CBBH (Selected FSIs for banking sector), CNB (Banking sector, Standard presentation 
format),  NBS  (2010,  2009),  IMF  (Financial  Soundness  Indicators  -  FSIs,  Global  Financial 
Stability Report, various editions). 
Notes: Data for Austria are on a consolidated basis from 2004, comparability across years is 
therefore limited. Due to differences in national accounting, taxation, and supervisory regimes, 
profitability data are not strictly comparable across countries. 
 
 
Development of domestic loans 
 
Compared to other countries, the credit stocks in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and 
Serbia were on relative low levels in 2002. However, with the entry of foreign banks, the 
Balkan countries have experienced a significant increase in private sector credits. Figure 3 
shows the development of credits in the three countries on a quarterly basis. Starting from a 
level of about 27% of GDP, total credits in Bosnia and Herzegovina increased steadily and reached almost 60% in September 2008.
4
 The rise was due to an increase in loans to private 
households  and  private  non-financial  business.  Loans  to  other  sectors,  which  include  the 
governmental  sector  or  public  enterprises,  experienced  a  drop  in  March  2004  and  then 
remained constant. However, the outbreak of the global financial crisis in September 2008 
stopped the rise in lending in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
Figure 3: Domestic loans in percent of GDP, 2002-2009 
 
Source: CBBH, CNB, CROSTAT, NBS, RZS. 
Notes: GDP for Bosnia and Herzegovina has been calculated by linear interpolation of annual 
GDP. GDP for Croatia and Serbia relates to a 4-quarter rolling sum. 
 
 
Croatia had a higher credit to GDP ratio than Bosnia and Herzegovina at the beginning of 
2002. Starting from 40%, total credits in Croatia have been on the rise too, which has been 
                                                 
4 For Bosnia and Herzegovina, no quarterly GDP data are available. Therefore, quarterly GDP has been 
calculated by linear interpolation of annual GDP data. mainly  due  to  an  increase  in  lending  to  private  households.  In  contrast  to  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina, the increase in credits in Croatia was already slowed at the end of 2007, when 
the first signs of a financial crisis in the USA occurred. 
With a level  of nearly  12% of GDP,  Serbia had the lowest  credit stock of the three 
countries  in  2002.  Similar  to  the  other  two  countries,  lending  to  private  sector  in  Serbia 
experienced a steady increase, and at the end of 2009, the credit to GDP ratio was more than 
40%. In Serbia the financial crisis had its effects only on lending to private households, which 
has been decreasing after the outbreak of the crisis in September 2008. 
As was shown in figure 3, loans to the private sector in the three countries experienced 
fast growth rates prior to the recent financial and economic crisis. Two questions arise in the 
context with this credit expansion. First, how fast should credits be rising in the process of 
economic development and the catch-up with developed countries? Second, when does the 
speed of lending growth endanger financial and economic stability? According to Caprio and 
Klingebiel (1996), real credit growth of one to two times real GDP growth may occur in 
normal times as a result of financial deepening. By contrast, a real growth rate of credits that 
exceeds two times real GDP growth indicates a lending boom and may lead to a banking 
crisis, as was the case in Latin American countries in the past.
5
 Table 2 shows the real credit 
growth rates and real GDP growth rates for the three Balkan countries. 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, real growth rates of total credit always exceeded real GDP 
growth by more than two times between 2002 and 2008. Credit expansion was then stopped in 
2009, when due to the global financial and economic crisis negative real credit growth rates 
occurred. According to the above definition, Croatia faced a lending boom too from 2002 to 
2006. The boom has been stopped in 2007 and in 2009 total credits in Croatia show a negative 
growth rate. For Serbia, a lending boom can be identified in the period 2003-2008, with a 
slight break in 2006. Although the real growth of total credits decreased significantly in 2009 
in Serbia, it has not been negative like in the other two countries. 
 
                                                 
5 Another definition of a lending boom has been presented by Gourinchas et al. (2001). A lending boom there is 
identified by deviations of the credit to GDP ratio from its long-term trend. We do not utilize this method here, 
because the period of our sample is relatively short and the identification of a long-term trend would be hardly 
possible. However, Cottarelli et al. (2005) apply this method to countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the 
Balkans. They do not find any lending boom regarding total credits. In the case of credits to the household sector 
they detect significant deviations for Hungary or a borderline case in Romania. They also present further 
calculations in order to examine, if the credit development in these countries is consistent with the process of 
convergence to developed countries. They estimate equilibrium levels for bank credit to the private sector, based 
on a panel of non-transition developing and industrialized countries, and compare this equilibrium levels with 
the actual levels. They conclude that in 2002 bank credit to private sector was above its equilibrium level only in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and close to equilibrium in Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro. For all other countries, 
credit to the private sector was below its equilibrium level in 2002. Table 2: Real growth rates of loans and GDP, 2002-2009 
 
Source: CBBH, CNB, NBS. 
 
 
It can also be seen from table 2, that prior to the financial crisis the fastest growth rates 
occurred in the private household sector, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. 
The credit growth to the household sector in Croatia has been slower than in the other two 
countries, but Croatia had the highest credit to GDP ratio in this sector at the beginning of 
2002. Furthermore, the household credit to GDP ratio in Croatia is comparable to that of 
developed countries, like Italy or Greece (Kraft 2007: 353). The rise in indebtedness of the 
household sector is mainly the result of an increase in mortgages and credit card lending by 
foreign banks. In addition, domestic banks may have also been attracted by high profitability 
and therefore entered the field of lending to private households (Lapavitsas 2009a: 18). As the 
financial crisis broke out, the private household sector have experienced the sharpest drop in 
credit  growth  in  2009,  with  real  credit  declining  by  -5.47  and  -5.17  in  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina and Croatia, respectively. 
Credit  growth  was  initially  financed  by  rising  deposits,  which  were  the  result  of  the 
changeover process of pre-Euro currencies to Euros (Kraft & Jankov 2005: 110). While a 
further increase in deposits was an important factor for the lending boom during the 2000s, 
the contribution of capital inflows to the funding of credit growth played an increasing role. In 
the case of Croatia, the high interest gap between Croatia and the Eurozone has been an 
important factor for these capital flows, which were used for credit expansion, particularly in the household sector (Kraft 2007: 349). A detailed explanation of the capital flows to the 
Balkan countries is subject to the next section. 
 
Development of cross-border lending 
 
Capital movements have experienced a sharp increase due to capital market liberalization 
since the 1970s. But such capital movements are also subject to high capital flow reversals in 
times of crisis and are therefore characterized by a high volatility. For example, net short-term 
capital inflows to developing countries showed a sharp increase between 2003 and 2007, but 
turned  negative  in  the  recent  economic  crisis  (Cordero  &  Montecino  2010:  12-14). 
Particularly  developing  countries  have  been  faced  with  huge  capital  inflows  during  good 
times, which led to an appreciation of the domestic currency and a loss of competitiveness of 
the tradable sector. However, when economic conditions become less favourable, capital flow 
reversals occur and difficulties in the balance of payments may result. 
An important part of these capital flows is constituted by cross-border bank lending. The 
cross-border claims of banks, particularly of European banks, achieved high levels prior to the 
economic crisis of 2007-2010. Regarding the Euro Area this is true for both, lending from 
core Eurozone states (Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands) to the periphery (Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain) and from the periphery to the core (RMF 2010: 39). Cross-
border lending to  transition  and developing countries  showed also  an increase until  2008 
(Cordero & Montecino 2010: 14). These capital flows contributed to the debt-based growth in 
some Central, Eastern and Southeastern European countries, which came to an end after the 
outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008. 
To  examine  the  cross-border  bank  lending  to  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  Croatia  and 
Serbia, data from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) were used. The BIS publishes a 
set of banking data on a quarterly basis. To trace cross-border lending it is useful to turn to the 
locational banking statistics, which are consistent with the principles of balance of payments 
data.
6




                                                 
6 The BIS locational banking statistics provide quarterly data on gross on-balance sheet asset and liability 
positions of banks in major banking centres vis-à-vis banks and non-banks located in other countries. The 
locational statistics are not consolidated and are based on the residence principle. Therefore, consistence with 
balance of payments data is given. The implication for our purpose is that these data also include cross-border 
flows from parent banks to their subsidiaries and vice versa. Figure 4: Outstanding claims of BIS-reporting banks vis-à-vis the Balkans in percent of GDP, 
2002-2009 
 
Source: BIS (Locational banking statistics 6A & 6B), CBBH, CROSTAT, RZS. 
Notes: The data for Serbia refer to Serbia and Montenegro until September 2006. GDP for Bosnia 
and Herzegovina has been calculated by linear interpolation of annual GDP. GDP for Croatia 
and Serbia relates to a 4-quarter rolling sum. 
 
 
Cross-border lending has been increasing in all countries from the first quarter of 2002 to 
the end of 2009, with Croatia having by far the highest ratio of capital inflows to GDP during 
the whole period. In Bosnia and Herzegovina the development has been driven by capital 
flows to the banking sector. These capital flows were partly the result of lending of foreign-
owned banks from their parent banks, in order to finance credit expansion. This was also the 
case in Croatia and Serbia, but these two countries additionally have experienced a large 
increase in capital flows to the non-bank sector. However, the flows to the non-bank sector 
stagnated (Croatia) or even decreased (Serbia) after the outbreak of the financial crisis in 
September 2008. Because the BIS-statistics are presented in US Dollar terms, the changes in the stocks of 
cross-border banking flows may be partly the result of exchange rate movements. In order to 
eliminate these shortcomings, the BIS also provides data for exchange rate value-adjusted 
changes  in  the  stocks  of  cross-border  claims.  These  adjusted  capital  flows  to  the  Balkan 
countries are shown in figure 5 on an index basis.
7
 As can be seen, capital flows to the region 
accelerated at the end of 2005, particularly in Croatia and Serbia. The financial crisis then led 
to a significant drop in all three countries. 
 
Figure 5: Index of exchange rate value-adjusted changes in the stocks of cross-border claims 
(Ø2005=100), 2002-2009 
 
Source: BIS (Locational banking statistics 6A & 6B). 
Notes: The data for Serbia refer to Serbia and Montenegro until December 2006. 
                                                 
7 An index has been calculated in order to make the results for the three countries comparable. Alternatively, the 
ratio of capital flows to GDP could have been calculated to compare the results. However, this method was not 
possible here, as there are no quarterly data for GDP in Bosnia and Herzegovina available. Prior to the financial crisis, there was a rising trend in the exchange rate value adjusted 
changes  in  the stocks of cross-border claims to the banking sector in  all three  countries. 
Regarding  the  non-bank  sector,  no  such  clear  trend  can  be  observed  for  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina. By contrast, in Croatia and Serbia, the flows to the non-banking sector show a 
considerable increase. The outbreak of the financial crisis then led to a drop in the capital 
flows to both, the bank and the non-bank sector in all three countries. In contrast to the 
banking sector, the flows to non-banks did not really recover during 2009. 
Finally, the nationality of BIS-reporting banks, which are most involved in the credit 
expansion  in  the  Balkans,  should  be  mentioned.  The  BIS  provides  also  data,  tracing  the 
nationality of BIS-reporting banks, which have claims vis-à-vis other countries (consolidated 
banking  statistics).
8
  Figure  6  shows  the  exposure  of  the  three  Balkan  countries  to  BIS-
reporting  banks  from  specific  EU  member  countries,  and  the  share  of  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia in the total exposure of banks from individual EU member 
countries to the CESEE region.
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Figure 6: Exposure of the Balkans to BIS-reporting banks and share of the Balkans in the total 
exposure of BIS-reporting banks to the CESEE region in percent, December 2009 
 
 
Source: BIS (Consolidated banking statistics 9D, ultimate risk basis). 
Notes: BH stands for Bosnia and Herzegovina, HR for Croatia, RS for Serbia, AT for Austria, IT 
for Italy, DE for Germany, FR for France and GR for Greece. 
 
                                                 
8 The consolidated banking statistics provide information of the exposure of BIS-reporting banks on a worldwide 
consolidated basis. The data include the exposure of these banks to other countries and the exposure of their 
foreign offices. In contrast to the locational banking statistics, inter-office positions are excluded here, due to the 
consolidation of the data. 
9 The CESEE region here includes the following countries: Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, 
Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey and Ukraine. As can be seen, while the Balkan countries are most exposed to Austrian
10
 banks, the 
exposure of banks from EU member countries is the highest for Croatia. Furthermore, there is 
a strong asymmetry between the exposure of the Balkan countries to banks from EU member 
countries and the exposure of banks from the EU member countries to individual Balkan 
countries. For example, the exposure of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austrian banks amounts 
for nearly 59%, while the exposure of Austrian banks to Bosnia and Herzegovina accounts for 
only 2% of their total exposure to the CESEE countries. This leaves the Balkan countries 
highly dependent on credit supply from BIS-reporting banks, and modest changes in the credit 
policy by parent banks may have considerable negative macroeconomic and financial stability 
effects in the Balkan countries (Mihaljek 2008: 29). 
 
Financial and macroeconomic stability 
 
As  was  shown,  the  three  Balkan  countries  have  been  faced  with  a  fast  increase  in 
domestic  credit,  particularly  in  the  household  sector.  In  addition,  there  has  also  been  an 
increase in cross-border lending. As loans to private sectors are rising at a fast pace, concerns 
about the quality of outstanding loans may arise. These concerns have gained importance, 
since the outbreak of the recent financial crisis has questioned the quality of banking assets. 
Table 3 shows the development of non-performing loans as a percentage of total loans for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia. 
 
Table 3: Non-performing loans in percent of total loans, 9.2008-9.2010 
 
Source:  CBBH,  CNB,  NBS,  IMF  (Financial  Soundness  Indicators  -  FSIs,  Global  Financial 
Stability Report, various editions). 
 
 
In comparison to other CESEE countries, like Romania or Ukraine, the share of bad loans 
in total loans is relatively low in the three Balkan countries. However, the share of bad loans 
has been rising steadily since the third quarter of 2008. Non-performing loans in Bosnia and 
                                                 
10 The Bank Austria Creditanstalt as part of the Unicredit Group is treated as an Italian bank in figure 6. This 
stands in contrast to figure 2, where it is mentioned as Austrian bank. Herzegovina have tripled from September 2008 to September 2010. In Croatia there was a 
high growth of bad loans too, reaching a share of 9% in March 2010. With a level of 17.8% in 
the third quarter of 2010, Serbia had a significantly higher share of non-performing loans in 
total loans than the other two countries. 
Such increasing credit risk may lead to a slowdown in credit growth, because banks have 
to increase the provisioning rates, which in turn would lead to lower profitability for the banks 
in the region (Mihaljek 2008: 27). While in good times the capital flows from parent banks to 
their subsidiaries show an increase, they may be subject to sudden stops or even reversals 
when economic conditions get worse. Capital flow reversals may be the case, if, for example, 
parent banks withdraw profits from their subsidiaries due to liquidity problems in their home 
market (Mihaljek 2008: 28). Although the major active banks have agreed in the  Vienna 
Initiative in June 2009 not to stop their activities in the region, it is not predictable how these 
banks will act in the future. For example, the Austrian Hypo Group Alpe Adria, which has 
been rescued by the Austrian government, has announced that it will reduce its assets. In 
general,  banks  may  shrink  their  balance  sheet  in  order  to  maintain  capital  adequacy 
requirements.  This  may  result  in  a  reduction  of  credit  supply  in  Central,  Eastern  and 
Southeastern Europe or even a withdrawal of foreign banks from the region. 
A further threat for financial stability may be presented by foreign currency loans. In 
Bosnia and Herzegovina credits in foreign currency or indexed to foreign currency accounted 
for 73.9% of total credits at the end of 2009 (CBBH 2010b: 68). In the same year, in Croatia 
some 70% of loans to the household sector were either in foreign currency or indexed to 
foreign currency (CNB 2010: 23). In Serbia, such loans accounted for 80% of total loans to 
the  household  sector  in  2009  (NBS  2010:  14).  In  addition,  the  lending  of  non-financial 
business from abroad has been on the rise over the last years, particularly in Croatia and 
Serbia. Thus, financial stability is highly exposed to foreign currency risk. However, as the 
Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina operates under a currency board, and the Croatian 
Kuna is pegged to the Euro, the exposure of credits to changes in exchange rates has been 
limited. By contrast, the National Bank of Serbia operates under a managed float combined 
with  some  sort  of  inflation  targeting.  Here  the  exposure  of  loans  in  foreign  currency  to 
exchange rate movements is higher, particularly because the Serbian Dinar has experienced a 
reasonable devaluation since the outbreak of the recent financial and economic crisis. 
The fixed exchange rates in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia have been established in 
order to achieve low inflation rates. The primary goal of the National Bank of Serbia has also 
been to maintain price stability. As the three countries have a large share in trade with the European  Union,  their  strong  commitment  to  low  inflation  makes  them  less  competitive, 
because the higher inflation rates relative to the EU member countries have negative effects 
on  real  exchange  rates  and  commodity  trade.  Particularly  Croatia  and  Serbia  show  an 
overvaluation of real exchange rates (Holzner 2006). As a result, the high trade and current 
account  deficits make these countries  highly dependent  on capital  flows and leaves  them 
highly vulnerable to external factors (Becker 2008). 
Such capital  flows, in addition to an increase in domestic credits, has  been the main 
contributor for economic growth in these countries. The growth model, mainly based on rising 
indebtedness of the household sector, came to and end as the recent financial crisis broke out. 
The  region  was  therefore  part  of  the  global  imbalances  between  debt-led  and  export-led 
growth models.
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 Although, the consequences of the financial and economic crisis of 2007-
2010 were not as high as in other debt-led economies, like for example Latvia, the Balkan 




The countries of Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe have been seriously hit by the 
recent financial and economic crisis. This has been mainly the consequence of the breakdown 
of a growth model, which has been based on the rising indebtedness of the private sector. The 
purpose of this paper, therefore, was to explain the role foreign banks played in the credit 
expansion in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia. Particularly Austrian banks have 
expanded aggressively into the Balkans, holding an ownership share of more than 60% of 
foreign-owned banks in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. In Serbia, the dominance of 
Austrian banks is lower, but accounts also for considerable 37%. 
With the entry of foreign banks, the Balkans have been faced with a fast increase in loans 
to  the private sector. The high profitability in  the banking sector in  the Balkans and the 
increasing profit-orientation of EU banks has been the major cause of this credit growth, 
which was mainly driven by the rising indebtedness of the household sector. Furthermore, the 
rise in domestic loans has been accompanied by an increase in cross-border lending by the 
Balkan countries. Particularly Croatia shows a high level of cross-border indebtedness to BIS-
reporting banks. 
                                                 
11 For further details on debt-led and export-led growth models and the structural causes of the financial and 
economic crisis of 2007-2010, see Stockhammer (2008, 2009, 2010a) or IMK (2009a, 2009b, 2009c). During the lending boom, banks were engaged in risky lending practices. Additionally, 
the fast credit growth rates led to an inability to appropriately asses the risk of borrowers’ 
default. As the financial and economic crisis spilled over to the Balkans, these risky loans 
turned into bad loans. The share of non-performing loans in Bosnia and Herzegovina has 
tripled from the end of 2008 to the end of 2010. In Croatia bad loans have doubled, and Serbia 
shows a serious share of non-performing loans in total loans of nearly 18%. Bad loans are 
even expected to increase further in 2011, and therefore present a threat for financial stability 
in the region. 
With the outbreak of the recent financial and economic crisis and the increase in bad 
loans, banks reduced their lending, particularly lending to private households, which led to a 
slowdown in  credit growth rates. The reduction of domestic credits  was  accompanied by 
capital  flow  reversals,  particularly  in  Croatia  and  Serbia,  as  economic  conditions  turned 
negative. The slowdown of credits led to a drop in economic growth, as the three countries 
relied heavily on private indebtedness in the past. As a consequence, the Balkan countries are 
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